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abstract: Constructivism is the metaethical position stating that although we 
cannot have direct access to moral facts, we can still come up with a set of principles 
that can be justified and that ought to be respected by individuals. The strength of 
these moral principles derives from the fact that they are the result of a procedure 
respecting certain desirable conditions. Constructivism concerns the methodology 
of political philosophy, being preoccupied with the process of generating and 
justifying moral principles. In this review article I present the main contentions 
of constructivism (focusing especially on the Kantian constructivism advanced by 
Rawls and Scanlon), describe its positioning on the realist–antirealist axis, and 
compare it with its main competitor in the field of metaethical views, intuitionism. I 
dedicate a separate section to the method of reflective equilibrium, which represents 
an important part of several metaethical accounts, be they constructivist, realist, 
or intuitionist. I show how reflective equilibrium represents the main instrument 
constructivists can employ in order to capture the appeal of relying on intuitions 
in moral theorizing, without leaning toward intuitionism. Toward the end of the 
article I present G. A. Cohen’s (2003, 2008) criticism of constructivism. I focus on 
the replies Ronzoni and Valentini (2008), Hall (2013), de Maagt (2014, 2016) and 
Rossi (2016) give to Cohen, ending with a criticism of my own.
key words: Constructivism, fact-sensitivity, intuitionism, realism and antirealism, 
reflective equilibrium
Introduction
The main purpose of this article is to defend a constructivist method 
of generating and justifying principles of justice, by presenting its main 
contentions and its positioning on the realist–antirealist axis, the way 
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constructivists employ the instrument of reflective equilibrium in order 
to account for the role of intuitions without facing the problems en-
countered by intuitionist approaches, and how it can respond to a series 
of objections.
Before I properly introduce constructivism, I would like to point out 
an interesting relation that contemporary political philosophy has with 
facts. Faced with countless examples of highly idealized societies, such 
as Dworkin’s (2002) society whose economy focuses on plovers’ eggs 
and pre-phylloxera claret, or Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s (2008) world 
inhabited by either persons born with two pairs of eyes or persons born 
with no eyes, one may find it difficult to ascertain the relevance for our 
real world of such far-fetched examples. Nevertheless, many philosophers 
resort to such thought experiments. As Elster (2011) emphasizes, these 
counterfactual examples usually belong to one of the following “para-
digmatic positions”: conceivabilism or realism. Conceivabilists consider 
that if you can imagine it, then you can use it. Thus, we are faced with 
making a choice between allowing billions of people to suffer extreme 
agony for only a minute, or subjecting fifteen people to decades of agony 
(Parfit 2012); we encounter societies in which the fate of individuals’ 
well-being is dependent on manna from heaven or manna from hell 
(Nielsen 2017). Alternatively, we are led to reach the super-repugnant 
conclusion of considering that
a world populated by individuals every one of whom has a life barely worth living 
would be better than a world populated by ten billion individuals all of whom 
have very worthwhile lives, if only the former population has an appropriate 
size. (Holtug 2007: 8)
Realists, on the other hand, consider that “only cases which could plau-
sibly occur given the world as it is should be used to elicit intuitions” 
(Elster 2011: 242). Indeed, it is highly plausible that, if an unfortunate 
soul got trapped under a TV station transmitter during a World Cup 
football game, a decision maker could face the choice between (a) 
rescuing him immediately by turning off the transmission for fifteen 
minutes and (b) rescuing him only after the game is over (Scanlon 1998, 
Fleuerbaey and Tungodden 2010). It is not too far-fetched to think of 
a Health Impact Fund that would encourage pharmaceutical compa-
nies to trade monopoly pricing for immediate rewards based on the 
estimated global effect of the newly developed medicine (Pogge 2008). 
Although the realist position is well represented in philosophy, especially 
in debates concerning global justice, many papers aiming at refining a 
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certain distributive principle or defending or criticizing a distributive 
pattern or currency make use of counterfactual examples. Therefore, we 
see that facts are heavily featured in contemporary philosophy in the 
choice of examples designed as part of the case-implication strategy of 
argumentation for or against a principle or theory (Sen 1979).
A second venue in which facts appear is in the evaluation of norma-
tive models. According to Volacu (2017), facts are featured either in the 
outputs of a theory, when you subject the implications of said theory to 
a feasibility test, or in the inputs of a theory, when you have to choose 
whether to introduce in the theory “descriptive assumptions, which make 
some form of empirical claims about the state of the world” (Volacu 
2017: 3). According to Volacu, considerable confusion has been caused 
by conflating the two distinct ideas of fact-sensitivity and feasibility. 
Whereas fact-sensitivity affects the inputs of a theory, the feasibility 
constraint concerns the outputs of a theory. Fact-sensitivity is related to 
the investigation of what Korsgaard (1996) calls “the sources of normativ-
ity”. By the end of this article, I hope to have vindicated a constructivist 
perspective on generating and justifying principles of justice, with the 
constructivist procedure acting as the source of normativity. Construc-
tivism can vindicate the role played by facts in contemporary political 
philosophy. Thus, while much of the paper is dedicated to constructiv-
ism in metaethics, the discussion is also relevant to political philosophy. 
While the justifiability of constructivism has to start from metaethical 
foundations, the implications are also of relevance for political philoso-
phy, and for how we use a constructivist procedure in order to defend 
normative principles.
Constructivism and intuitionism
In his Theory of Justice, John Rawls points time and again to the con-
nection between justice and fairness and various elements of Immanuel 
Kant’s philosophy. For instance, in his criticism of utilitarianism, Rawls 
introduces the idea of the priority of the right over the good, which he 
notes “is a central feature of Kant’s ethics” (1971: 31, n16). Discussing the 
condition of publicity, Rawls mentions that it “is clearly implicit in Kant’s 
doctrine of the categorical imperative insofar as it requires us to act in 
accordance with principles that one would be willing as a rational being 
to enact as law for a kingdom of ends” (1971: 133). The thought experi-
ment from which different parties have to assess the menu of political 
principles, the original position, is considered “a procedural interpretation 
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of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative” (1971: 
256). It is, however, in one of his later works that Rawls clarifies how 
much his project is indebted to Kant. In Theory of Justice, rational and 
reasonable parties under a veil of ignorance had selected the principles 
of justice as fairness. Rawls claims that “one should not be misled by the 
somewhat unusual conditions which characterize the original position”, 
as we could arrive at a similar configuration of principles if we resorted to 
reflective equilibrium” (1971: 20–21). Reflective equilibrium constitutes 
the main topic of a subsequent section, but for the moment it is suf-
ficient to say that it serves the purpose of showing that “the conditions 
embodied in the description of the original position are ones that we do 
in fact accept. Or, if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do 
so by philosophical reflection” (1971: 21). In “Kantian constructivism in 
moral theory”, Rawls takes a step further and presents an argument for 
how a conception of justice (such as, but not limited to, justice as fair-
ness) could be justified, even if we had reasonable doubt about its truth. 
For Rawls, Kantian constructivism “holds that moral objectivity is to be 
understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that 
all can accept” (1980: 519). In order to decide upon a set of principles, 
argues Rawls, we need not presume the existence of moral facts:
[…] whether certain acts are to be recognized as reasons of right and justice can 
be ascertained only from within the constructive procedure, from the undertak-
ings of rational agents of construction when suitably represented as free and 
equal moral persons. (Rawls 1980: 519).
More generally, what Kantian constructivism does is “set up a proce-
dure of construction which answers to certain reasonable requirements, 
and within this procedure persons characterized as rational agents of 
construction specify, through their agreements, the first principles of 
justice” (1980: 516).
Rawls advances a proceduralist characterization of constructivism 
(Street 2010: 364). According to this interpretation, constructivism’s 
unique character is that it derives the rightness of a moral principle from 
the procedure that led to its adoption (Stret 2010: 365), amounting to a 
view in which “what comes out of a certain kind of situation is to count 
as just” (Barry 1991: 266). In all of its forms, constructivism aims to 
answer what Scanlon calls the “question of practical significance”: why 
are moral demands authoritative? Closely intertwined with this is what 
we could call the question of epistemic significance: “how is it possible 
for us to come to know truths about morality?” (Scanlon 2012: 227). 
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For Ronzoni and Valentini (2008: 404), constructivism originates in 
an attempt to “reconcile agnosticism about moral facts with optimism 
about moral justification.” As Lenman and Shemmer (2012) underline, 
constructivism has been deliberately or accidentally adopted by many 
theorists due to its capacity to explain the force moral precepts exert, 
without delving into strong metaphysical assumptions about moral facts.
One must be careful when discussing truth in constructivism. At 
most, we can talk about truth in a coherentist way (Young 2018), which 
states that a belief or set of beliefs are justified to the extent that they 
cohere with another set of beliefs, and the set forms a coherent system 
(Olsson 2017). One of the key methods employed by constructivists, 
reflective equilibrium, is coherentist, with some even calling it “the most 
popular version of moral coherentism” (Timmons 1990: 97, see also 
Daniels 1980). Therefore, when constructivists say that there are true 
moral facts, they use a weaker interpretation than in strong versions of 
foundationalism such as rational intuitionism (Ebertz 1993: 198, n9).
Unlike other metaethical approaches, constructivism is supposed 
to be applicable. For Korsgaard (2008a: 321–322), “constructivism is 
the use of reason to solve practical problems […] normative concepts 
are not the names of objects or of facts that we encounter in the world 
[but] solutions of problems.” Compare this to intuitionism, according 
to which moral properties are “objective and irreducible”, and, at an 
epistemological level, “at least some moral truths are known intuitively” 
(Huemer 2005: 6). Before I proceed with presenting intuitionism and 
the constructivist challenge to it, I must clarify the fact that modern 
intuitionists do not consider intuitions “infallible or indefeasible” (Hue-
mer 2005: 105). Rather, intuitions may be regarded more as “starting 
points for philosophical theories, providing ideas for exploration, evi-
dence for judgment, and guidance to action” (Audi 2015: 76). However, 
intuitionism also brings with it an additional layer of metaphysical and 
epistemological assumptions which are missing from the constructivist 
scaffolding. Evidence for this is the fact that different variants of ethical 
intuitionism go hand in hand with foundationalism, which states that 
“the set of a person’s justified empirical beliefs has the following structure: 
some of its members depend for their justification on other members 
whose justification in turn is not so dependent” (Timmons 1987: 596). 
Irrespective of whether we can put an equals sign between foundation-
alism and intuitionism, what both approaches do is single out a set of 
moral beliefs that are “privileged or directly justifiable” (Daniels 2016). 
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No such strategy is available to the constructivist, who must prove the 
justifiability of all moral beliefs. In what follows I focus on highlighting 
the inherent issues of intuitionism, while simultaneously trying to salvage 
intuitions as legitimate instruments in the process of moral justification.
Intuitionism’s history is interwoven with the development of the 
metaethical position of foundationalism. What foundationalists argue is 
that a moral belief is justified to the extent that it is either foundational, 
i.e. non-inferentially justified, or based on the appropriate kind of infer-
ences from such foundational beliefs (Brink 1987: 74). Intuitionism, as a 
variant of moral foundationalism, “requires of every justified moral belief 
that it be foundational or that the termini of its justification include 
foundational moral beliefs” (Brink 1987: 74). For Price, “many instances 
of truths [are] discernible no other way than intuitively”, although 
“learned men have strangely confounded and obscured by supposing 
them subjects of reasoning and deduction” (1974 [1757]: 159–160). For 
Sidgwick, intuitionism refers to “immediate judgment as to what ought 
to be done or aimed at” (1962: 97). The minimal core that all intuitionist 
theories share is the “irreducible plurality of moral principles that are 
non-inferentially and intuitively knowable” (Audi 2004: 197). At first 
glance, intuitionism seems appealing due to several reasons: it relies on 
moral intuitions, which are widely used in applied ethics, political phi-
losophy, and political theory in general; and the principles intuitionists 
put forward are ones to which we relate, are present in several moral 
systems, and are a vital part of what we might call folk ethics.
Nonetheless, intuitionism brings to the table additional require-
ments for morality. Assuming that parsimony is a theoretical quality, a 
view stipulating the existence of a “faculty of intuition” (Audi 2015: 59) 
seems to rely too much on metaphysical assumptions. Another objection 
regularly raised against intuitionism is that it “must be embarrassed by 
the existence of conflicting moral beliefs” (Brink 1989: 108). Warnock 
(1967: 15–17) argues that intuitionism cannot lead to convincing one 
to adopt a specific course of action rather than another. This is a conse-
quence of the fact that intuitionism posits the existence of a “vast corpus 
of moral facts about the world”, without giving us a way to know them. 
Even if these arguments are not decisive against intuitionism, they do 
cast a shadow on its appeal. Furthermore, as most variants of intuitionism 
are based on a foundationalist theory of justification, the problems that 
plague foundationalism also damage intuitionism. According to Brink 
(1989: 122), “foundationalism cannot incorporate the epistemological 
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requirement that justifying beliefs themselves be justified.”  This failure 
is caused by the foundationalist requirement that the justification of 
some beliefs be non-inferential. 
The main allurement of intuitionism is given by the intuitions 
themselves. If we can incorporate intuitions into an alternate metaethical 
view, free from the metaphysically charged luggage of intuitionism, then 
we have a prima facie reason for preferring this alternative metaethical 
view. Are intuitions compatible with constructivism? In what follows, 
I argue that they are. 
Constructivism between realism and antirealism
In one of the most influential contemporary contractualist writings, 
Scanlon (1998) focuses on what moral principles we can advance that 
others cannot reasonably reject. In doing so, he resorts to a constructivist 
strategy of argumentation. According to him, it is doubtful that we can 
deny intuitions’ role in moral theorizing. He draws attention to the fact 
that “in Rawls’ overall theory […] the original position itself is justified 
by appeal to its ability to account for our considered judgments of justice 
in reflective equilibrium” (Scanlon 1998: 246). What must be clarified 
now is the role played by reflective equilibrium in constructivism. Some-
times, it seems that moral philosophers are unsure in which camp to 
place reflective equilibrium. Brun (2013: 248) mentions that we can see 
reflective equilibrium as a “minimally intuitionist method”. Hare (1989) 
also calls reflective equilibrium a kind of  “subjective intuitionism”, a label 
to which he suggests Rawls may not be privy (1989: 83). On the other 
hand, Dworkin (1989) mentions that we should distinguish between two 
ways of employing intuitions in our moral thinking: a natural one and a 
constructivist one. Reflective equilibrium, including Rawls’ overall use of 
“intuitions”, is of the second kind. While the natural model is about the 
discovery of a moral reality, the constructive model deals with institu-
tions as “stipulated features of a general theory to be constructed, as if 
a sculptor set himself to carve the animal that best fit a pile of bones he 
happened to find together” (Dworkin 1989: 28). Whereas the first model 
seems to be connected to moral realism, the second is more in line with 
the kind of ethical constructivism depicted in the previous section. Moral 
realism is “a thesis about the metaphysical status of moral claims, which 
not only purport to but often do state facts and refer to real properties, 
and that we can and do have at least some true moral beliefs and moral 
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knowledge” (Brink 1989: 7). By contrast, constructivists try to justify 
the action-guiding function of ethical guidelines by giving up on that 
thesis (O’Neill 2003: 348). 
The debate concerning moral realism centers on metaethical mat-
ters, trying to ascertain whether there are moral truths and how it is 
possible to attain knowledge in regard to morality (Copp 2006). As all 
other metaethical views, realism tries to give an answer to the question 
of what is objectivity. The realist position is that moral facts and truths 
are objective in some way (Brink 1989: 14). The constructivist position 
is that “the correctness of moral beliefs is to be determined by reference 
to the practical point of view an individual has to accept independent of 
her specific desires, aims, or beliefs” (De Maagt 2016: 8). In one of the 
most plausible versions of moral realism, this approach is also considered 
capable of explaining the action-guiding character of morality, which is 
supposedly one of the strengths of constructivism. According to Brink, 
this is so because “we typically invite others to share our attitudes and 
prescribe courses of action because we hold the defeasible belief that these 
attitudes and courses of action are correct or valuable” (Brink 1989: 78). 
His realism (a metaphysical conception about the existence of facts) is 
accompanied by a coherentist moral epistemology
According to Brink, coherentism is compatible with realism as long 
as we do not assume objectivism about justification to be true. Brink 
makes a distinction between objectivism of moral facts (which moral 
realists embrace) and objectivism about justification (which moral realists 
ought to reject). Objectivism about justification holds that justification 
in holding a belief represents justification in arguing that belief to be 
true. However, this is a mistake of “overstating the connection between 
justification and truth” (Brink 1989: 126). Brink considers that adopting 
coherentism is a step ahead from traditional moral realists who relied 
on problematic foundationalist epistemological views (1989: 143). Brink 
even considers that Rawls could be interpreted as having construed a 
theory compatible with realism in some of his works (1989: 303). For 
instance, Brink reiterates what Rawls said about his political construc-
tivism, that “we try to avoid the problem of truth and the controversy 
between realism and subjectivism about the status of moral and political 
values” (Rawls 1985: 230). This, contends Brink, means that Rawls does 
not position himself on antirealist grounds (1989: 308). However, in his 
main study on constructivism, Rawls places himself on solid antirealist 
ground (Brink 1989: 315–320). What Brink finds problematic is the 
fact that Rawls employs a moral epistemology “that is incompatible with 
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the sort of coherence theory of justification in ethics that he has long 
advocated” (Brink 1989: 321). This stems from Rawls’ rejection of the 
idea that there exist evidence-independent moral facts, which in turn 
prompts him to assume that moral theory is underdetermined (Brink 
1989: 319). On the other hand, Brink considers that a coherentist theory 
of justification doubled by a moral realist metaphysical approach can 
explain why moral theory is not underdetermined, to a degree that Rawls’ 
constructivism is unable to emulate. The underdetermination charge is in 
fact one that is usually raised against reflective equilibrium (Raz 1982), so 
Brink attempts to salvage the method of reflective equilibrium by pulling 
it away from constructivism and toward moral realism. Nonetheless, I 
want to show that reflective equilibrium is not underdetermined, and 
can in fact lead to some agreement in regard to substantial matters. If 
that is the case, then there is no need to try to rescue it by resorting to 
a metaphysically charged approach such as moral realism. It also means 
that a definite positioning of constructivism on the realist–antirealist 
axis is less important than some other authors have made it out to be, 
which may also explain why Rawls himself sometimes seems to present 
an inconsistent stance in this regard.
Reflective equilibrium, intuition, 
and normative agreement
Constructivism’s main appeal is its practical character: the possibility to 
provide an objective account of morality without assuming too much 
about metaphysical matters. No one is singled out as having access to 
moral truth, and constructivists do not assume that there exists an ex-
ternal foundation for morality. Instead, “we are answerable to criteria of 
correctness that are internal to and constitutive of the very exercise of 
rationality” (Korsgaard 2008b: 13–15, 110–126, 207–229). How does 
this work exactly? As mentioned above, relying on intuitions alone does 
not suffice. Constructivism requires a more precise manner in which to 
generate moral principles. Rawls (1971) proposes the original position as 
a way to generate a conception of justice that respects certain criteria: the 
fact that arbitrary characteristics of a person such as race, class, gender 
and abilities are morally irrelevant, and the fact that parties should be 
free and equal. Scanlon (1998) proposes a contractual situation in which 
we have to come up with terms of cooperation that no one could reason-
ably reject. Reflective equilibrium serves as a more grounded method 
for justifying normative principles. It is a metaethical device, i.e. it does 
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not stipulate the content of morality, but instead provides the means 
through which we can ascertain the content of morality. Although it 
is a coherentist method, for proponents of reflective equilibrium what 
matters is not just attaining consistency between our judgments, but also 
how the equilibrium was reached (Scanlon 2014: 79). As Buckley (n.d.) 
puts it, “if political principles are to be justified as obligatory and morally 
authoritative, it is insufficient to derive them without also explaining 
why the point of view is also authoritative.”
Reflective equilibrium constitutes a project of attaining coherence 
between three types of beliefs held by a person: a set of considered moral 
judgments, a set of moral principles, and a set of relevant background 
theories (Daniels 1979: 258). It starts from the premise that our con-
sidered judgments hold “a certain reasonableness”. We start by giving 
up on judgments “which are likely to be erroneous or influenced by 
an excessive attention to our own interests. Considered judgments are 
those rendered under conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense 
of justice” (Rawls 1971: 47–48). However,
since we are of divided mind and our judgments conflict with those of other 
people, some of these judgments must eventually be revised, suspended, or 
withdrawn, if the practical aim of reaching reasonable agreement on matters of 
political justice is to be achieved. (Rawls 2001: 30)
Rawls writes of two types of equilibria, one narrow and the other one 
wide. A narrow reflective equilibrium is obtained when one “finds the 
conception of justice that makes the fewest revisions in that person’s 
initial judgments and proves to be acceptable when the conception is 
presented and explained” (Rawls 2001: 30). It does not take into account 
alternative conceptions of justice. By contrast, a wide reflective equilib-
rium takes those alternative conceptions into account and compels us 
to much more intensely work back and forth our considered judgments, 
principles and background theories (Daniels 2016). In such wide reflec-
tive equilibria, we have to include
an account of the conditions under which it would be fair for reasonable people 
to choose among competing principles, as well as evidence that the resulting 
principles constitute a feasible or stable conception of justice, that is, that people 
could sustain their commitment to such principles. (Daniels 2016)
According to Bonevac (2004: 366–369), the process through which we 
finally arrive at reflective equilibrium looks as follows. We start with the 
aforementioned considered judgments. Suppose that we try to achieve 
reflective equilibrium regarding intergenerational justice. We renounce 
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those intuitions that do not satisfy the criterion of  “considered”. Believing 
that only our offspring deserve resources in the future does not seem a 
very good starting point, rendering it exactly the kind of judgment that 
would be thrown away at this early stage. Afterwards we investigate a 
series of alternative sets of moral principles “which have varying degrees 
of fit with our moral judgments” (Daniels 1979: 258). We investigate, 
for instance, egalitarian, sufficientarian or prioritarian principles. We 
decide among these by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each 
and by resorting to a relevant set of background theories (Daniels 1979: 
258). For instance, suppose we find out that people despise egalitarian 
distributions. If that were the case, we might have to drop egalitarian 
principles. Assuming we end up with a set x of moral principles, the 
equilibrium does not end there. “No one type of considered moral judg-
ment is held immune to revision. We may have provisional fixed points 
among our considered moral judgments, but all considered judgments 
are revisable” (Daniels 1979: 267). At every stage we seek to determine 
whether there are discrepancies between our considered judgments, the 
principles that have the best fit with them, and the background theories 
we hold to be relevant here. Bonevac (2004) describes several ways in 
which such reconciliation could take place:
We either revise the considered judgement, adopting its negation instead, or 
revise our principles to drop or weaken one or more. We add or strengthen a 
principle to make the considered judgment derivable. We drop or weaken one or 
more principles to remove the inconsistency. We examine the judgment derivable 
from the considered judgments or our principles to see whether we are willing 
to include it or its negation among our considered judgment. We reconsider 
our background theories, asking whether it is advisable to reformulate them in 
light of the outcome of the adjustments made in our judgments and principles. 
(Bonevac 2004: 367–369)
Thus far, achieving reflective equilibrium has been described as an indi-
vidualistic process. In his later works, Rawls (1993) focuses more on the 
idea of an overlapping consensus between different equilibria. “Com-
plexity, uncertainty, variation in experience, lead human reason, when 
exercised under conditions of freedom, to an unavoidable pluralism of 
comprehensive moral and philosophical views” (Daniels 2016). Reflec-
tive equilibrium does not do all the work for constructivism. It simply 
represents an instrument that can be employed by individuals in order 
to see that the principles they propose are justifiable. In fact, this is the 
appeal of the reflective equilibrium emphasized by Raz (1982), although 
Raz himself does not consider it sufficient to validate the method of 
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reflective equilibrium: it “implies the proposition that the less likely one 
is to abandon a moral belief because one has acquired more informa-
tion, the more trustworthy that belief is” (1982: 329). However, how can 
diverse individuals, each equipped with a different reflective equilibrium, 
converge in their moral considerations? Does reflective equilibrium have 
the instruments to rule out unreasonable equilibria? As De Maagt asks, 
“should we believe that coherent homophobia is better justified than 
incoherent homophobia” (2016: 10)? The standard response of the pro-
ponents of reflective equilibrium is to say that such moral beliefs would 
ideally be ruled out by critical reflection in early stages of the equilib-
rium, or upon confrontation with other moral theories (DePaul 2006: 
613–614). Even if one cannot think on one’s own of counterarguments, 
the alternatives suggested by others have been mentioned as needing to 
be taken into account (Ebertz 1993: 213).
The process of reflective equilibrium is not complete until public 
confrontation with the ideas of others. While “wide reflective equilibrium 
remains at the center of Rawls’ account of individual moral deliberation 
about justice” (Daniels 2016), it is the engagement in public methods of 
justification of the ideas resulting from reflective equilibrium that puts 
a provisory stop to the process (Daniels 2016). This, however, seems an 
invitation to the underdetermination charge mentioned in the previous 
section. Bonevac (2004: 364) argues that there are no grounds for as-
suming that some equilibrium would emerge after the whole process. Or, 
if it does, it would be just a provisory one, as mentioned. What kind of 
equilibrium would this be? The best answer that a defender of reflective 
equilibrium would be able to give is that this is no problem at all. The 
dynamism of this method is part of its appeal: the fact that even when 
we think the process has ended we can still revise our judgments, seems 
to be a feature, not a bug. Public justifiability of principles of justice is 
not guaranteed unless we resort to the method of reflective equilibrium. 
Even if people were to disagree on the existence of the moral truth of the 
principles we propose, the fact that they are publicly justifiable means 
that they would at least be held as objective (Daniels 1979: 276). At the 
same time, reflective equilibrium solves the paradox identified before: the 
fact that while intuitions are appealing in moral philosophy, intuition-
ism faces insurmountable problems that have led many to consider it 
unacceptable as an epistemological method. It does so by allowing the 
moral inquirer to use intuitions in a way that does not involve relying 
on non-inferentially justified beliefs. What the moral inquirer does is 
A.-C. DUMITRU: How should we justify moral principles? 233
“continually reflect on what she already believes”, while remaining open 
to the possibility of revising those beliefs (DePaul 2006: 604).
In the following section I present two more objections to construc-
tivism, focusing on what could be considered the most powerful one 
raised so far, Cohen’s (2003) “fact-sensitivity” charge.
Constructivism and its critics
In this section I discuss two objections that have been raised against 
constructivism. One targets constructivism in general, whereas the second 
has been tailored as a charge against Rawls’ Kantian constructivism. The 
problem moral realists see with constructivism is that, even if construc-
tivism can justify moral beliefs, it fails to guarantee that they are true 
beliefs (Brink 1989: 34). However, whether there are moral facts or not 
is irrelevant from the standpoint of constructivism. Justification is all 
that matters; truth is superfluous. In Rawls’ words
what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent 
to and given to us […] moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably 
constructed social point of view that all can accept. (Rawls 1980: 519)
However, this answer begs the following question: is it valid to make 
inferences from false moral facts? In reply, the constructivist may say that 
this is still an interpretation of truth that comes from a realist world-
view. Constructivist views “understand normative truth as not merely 
uncovered by or coinciding with the outcome of a certain procedure, but 
as constituted by emergence from that procedure” (Street 2010: 365). 
We would then reach another problem, for this would “make it hard 
to see how constructivism could be a metaethical position at all”, as 
everyone would regard his or her procedure as the correct one, leading 
to a plethora of distinct metaethical interpretations (Street 2010: 365). 
In order to prevent this outcome, Street recommends that we give up 
on a strictly proceduralist interpretation of constructivism, and regard 
the Rawlsian original position as a heuristic device “whose function is 
to capture, organize and help us investigate what follows from a certain 
evaluative standpoint on the world” (Street 2010: 366). Thus, normativity 
is objective to the extent that valuing individuals confer value to those 
facts that they agree make up the fabric of morality (Street 2010: 371). 
In order to not let “anything go”, the constructivist has to explain what 
an individual must do in order to be qualified as a valuing agent and 
to “explain how standards of correctness in the normative domain get 
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generated by this attitude” (Street 2010: 369). Although procedure may 
not be everything, we cannot have constructivism without a procedure 
that respects certain criteria. What those criteria are will be seen in the 
response constructivists give to Cohen’s (2003, 2008) charge against 
Kantian constructivism. Among other things, the qualifier of seeing 
agents as reasonable free and equal agents is one of those constraints; 
for instance, an individual would not qualify as a valuing agent if she 
did not accept the “burdens of judgment”, the sources of reasonable 
disagreement in a political community (Rawls 1993: 54).
The second charge against constructivism stems from Cohen’s (2003) 
argument that constructivists mistake rules of regulation with principles 
of justice. Even in Theory of Justice, Rawls emphasizes the necessity of 
grounding a conception of justice in empirical condition:
[H]uman freedom is to be regulated by principles chosen in the light of mod-
erate scarcity […] justice as fairness is a theory of human justice and among 
its premises are the elementary facts about persons and their place in nature. 
(Rawls 1971: 257)
Rawls includes a plethora of factual information in the construction of 
the original position.1 In general, these amount to what Rawls calls “the 
circumstances of justice”. Here are included objective circumstances (the 
most important being the postulated condition of moderate scarcity) and 
subjective circumstances. Among the subjective circumstances Rawls 
mentions the fact that
men suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and judgment. 
Their knowledge is necessarily incomplete, their powers of reasoning, memory 
and attention are always limited, and their judgment is likely to be distorted 
by anxiety, bias, and a preoccupation with their own affairs. (Rawls 1871: 127)
Parties in the original position are endowed with such information 
concerning the circumstances of justice (Rawls 1971: 128). The parties 
know general aspects concerning the way modern societies function. 
Furthermore, they hold quite extensive knowledge regarding biologi-
cal evolution, economic processes, psychological phenomena, and the 
general tendencies of human behavior. In fact, in the absence of these 
factual claims, the parties would simply be unable to reach a conclusion 
regarding the content of justice. For instance, factual claims are behind 
the paramount importance conferred by Rawls to primary goods as 
all-purpose means (2001: 58). Given that the task of the principles of 
1 I thank Adrian Miroiu for this observation. 
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justice as fairness is to distribute those primary goods, facts seem to be 
front and center of Rawls’ enterprise.
Cohen’s position is that there exist true normative principles, al-
though he mentions that the fact-sensitivity thesis he upholds is neutral 
with respect to the “realism-anti-realism-quasi-realism-a-little-bit-of-
realism-here-not-so-much-realism-there” controversy (2003: 211). For 
Cohen, constructivism entails the acceptance of the fact-sensitive thesis, 
according to which at least some of the principles we propose include 
facts in the grounds for affirming them (2003: 213). In opposition, Co-
hen is the adept of the fact-insensitive thesis, which states that ultimate 
principles of justice ought not reflect factual claims (2003: 214). In order 
to illustrate this distinction, Cohen proceeds as follows. Suppose there 
is a principle P1 holding that individuals should be encouraged in their 
efforts to pursue life plans. Among the reasons we may have for P1 is the 
factual claim F1, which stipulates that people’s happiness is dependent 
on their ability to pursue life plans. In turn, F1 can support P1 in light of 
a more fundamental principle, P2, which could be a utilitarian principle, 
thus making the maximization of happiness a worthwhile goal. We could 
then further complicate the justificatory chain and introduce F2, which 
grounds P2 in the fact that promoting individuals’ happiness is a good 
way to show that we respect them. This could also entail principle P3, 
that expressing respect to individuals is a moral precept. P3 could then be 
based on F3, which posits some characteristics that are respect-meriting, 
and holds that people somehow satisfy those characteristics. Cohen 
mentions that now we could end the justification process by introducing 
P4 as a fact-free principle requiring that we respect beings with those 
characteristics that are respect-meriting. Cohen concludes by saying that 
either that principle is itself fact-insensitive, “or, if it is fact-sensitive, 
I would press beyond it to a fact-insensitive one” (2003: 216–217). In 
order to counteract the potential objection that this justificatory chain 
resembles a regress ad infinitum, Cohen provides an argument meant to 
show that this process is bound to have an end term. 
P1: Whenever a fact F supports a principle P, there must be an explanation of 
why F supports P.
P2: This explanation implies the existence of a more ultimate principle, to which 
we could commit even if F were to be denied. This more ultimate principle would 
provide an account of why F supports P.
P3: The sequence will reach an end “because our resources of conviction are finite”. 
Every fact-sensitive principle reflects a fact-insensitive principle. (Cohen 
2003: 218)
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Leaving aside for the moment the fact that P3 itself is based on a factual 
claim (that resources of conviction are finite), I concede this premise 
for the time being. The more egregious problem, nonetheless, is one 
tangentially touched by Cohen, that P3 “presupposes a controversially 
foundationalist view of justification” (2003: 222). Cohen thinks that 
it represents a small price to pay if it rescues justice from constructiv-
ism, perceived as inherently flawed given its conflation of fundamental 
principles and rules of regulation (2008: 279). Not only do the parties 
in the original position need to take into account considerations “that 
do not reflect the content of justice itself ”, but Rawls endows them 
with “cognitive resources that are redundant from the point of view of 
specifying what justice is” (2008: 283–284). Although facts would be 
required in selecting principles of regulation, which govern real societies, 
“[they] make no difference to the very nature of justice itself ” (2008: 285). 
Thus, Rawls’ efforts to define circumstances of justice reflect the wrong 
concern. Whereas rules of regulation do respond to the questions “Under 
what circumstances is the achievement of justice possible?” and “Under 
what circumstances do questions of justice arise?”, they should not be 
confused with the more fundamental question of “What is justice?” For 
Cohen, only a fact-insensitive, fundamental principle can respond to the 
latter question (2008: 331–335). Given that rules of regulation have to 
be balanced with other considerations – stability, efficiency, publicity – 
they “lack ultimacy […] they cannot tell us how to evaluate the effects 
by reference to which they themselves are to be evaluated” (Cohen 2003: 
241). Mistaking rules of regulation for fundamental principles means 
that Rawls sacrifices the content of justice for the sake of external con-
siderations, as in his compromise with the “incentives policy formed by 
capitalism” (Cohen 2008: 27–86). For Cohen, the added effects of giving 
the legislators in the original position the wrong tools, plus letting them 
pursue a different task from the one they would be capable of undertak-
ing, leads to a contentment “with an expedient compromise”, which is in 
fact a betrayal of justice (Cohen 2008: 86). Cohen does admit that there 
could be some fact-free principle grounding the principles that make up 
the justice as fairness conception, “but they are also hidden within the 
unstated content of the conception of human beings as free and equal 
that justifies the original position itself ” (2008: 292–293).
In what follows I present several objections raised against Cohen’s 
fact-insensitive thesis. The first of these, belonging to Ronzoni and Val-
entini (2008), holds that Cohen ignores the ontological agnosticism at 
the heart of constructivism. Hall (2014) and Rossi (2016) criticize Cohen 
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from a political realist2 approach to justice. De Maagt (2016) defends 
fact-sensitivity by introducing a further distinction between a fact-free 
supreme principle of morality (such as the categorical imperative for 
Kant or the stipulation that the parties in the original position are free 
and equal) and the content of morality, which includes fact-sensitive 
principles. Lastly, I sketch a novel objection to Cohen’s criticism. I 
advance the idea that Cohen’s thesis is affected by a conflation of fact-
dependency with fact-sensitivity. 
The fact-insensitivity thesis fails to consider constructivism’s  
ontological agnosticism (Ronzoni and Valentini 2008)
In their reply to Cohen, Ronzoni and Valentini draw attention to one 
important element in all constructivist accounts: that they try to com-
bine ontological agnosticism about the ability to track moral facts with 
optimism about the possibility of moral justification (2008: 404). Cohen’s 
main charge against constructivism is reconstructed in the form of the 
following dilemma: if the fact-insensitivity thesis is correct, construc-
tivists cannot claim that principles generated by procedures reliant 
on factual aspects represent fundamental principles of justice. Then, 
constructivists would either have to give up on the pretense that they 
formulate principles of justice and concede that their methods can only 
generate rules of regulation, or show that the end term of the justificatory 
chain may be something other than a factual claim. A potential defense 
of the constructivist position, briefly mentioned by Cohen, is to argue 
that the justificatory sequence ends with a methodological principle. For 
Cohen, methodological principles are not preoccupied with the content 
of morality, but rather with “how to generate normative principles” (2003: 
219). Ronzoni and Valentini mention two ways in which these method-
ological principles can be seen: either as imperatives (follow procedure 
x!) or, more plausibly, as “thinking of them as principles that explain how 
to generate normative principles and indicate which criteria one ought 
to adopt when one engages in substantive normative theorizing” (2008: 
408–409). In this second understanding of methodological principles, 
they are normatively charged, but they are not substantive normative 
principles (2008: 409).
2 Political realism here is different from the previous two understandings of the term. 
According to this conception, “political philosophy should [issue] theories about the distinctive 
forces that shape real politics” (Rossi and Sleat 2014: 689). 
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Ronzoni and Valentini provide the following justificatory sequence. 
We can start from principle P1, which refers to the legitimacy of those 
principles generated by following procedure X. P1 rests on the factual 
claim F1, according to which X represents the constructive procedure 
best suited for the task of justifying normative principles in a world in 
which we cannot track moral facts. P2 says that one ought not to advance 
principles whose validity is grounded in the existence of independent 
moral facts, given the agnosticism encouraged by constructivists. How-
ever, this agnosticism is itself based on F2, according to which we find 
ourselves in the impossibility of having decisive arguments in favor of, 
or against, the existence of independent moral facts. The end term in 
the sequence is P3, which holds that moral theorizing should not start 
from assumptions “whose validity or truth is beyond the limits of what 
we can plausibly claim to know” (2008: 409). P3 is not grounded in 
facts, but neither does it represent a substantive moral principle, as it 
simply specifies a condition that ought to be respected in the process of 
generating substantive principles. 
Applying this argumentation to Rawls, Ronzoni and Valentini hold 
that the assumptions that the parties in the original position are free and 
equal need not be interpreted as a substantive conviction (2008: 410). 
Far from being a substantive commitment, modeling the parties as free 
and equal represents a rational strategy to pursue in settings in which 
there is no pre-established authority. Imposing our views on others when 
anyone has the opportunity to be right “is beyond the limits of what we 
can plausibly claim to know”, which would amount to our actions not 
being “rationally justified” (2008: 411-412). Thus, “it is not intrinsically 
wrong to claim the moral entitlement to impose our views on others 
because they are worthy of respect; rather, it is irrational” (2008: 411). 
Intersubjective justification would be impossible in the absence of ac-
cepting this minimal premise. The same argument may apply to Rawls’ 
later works. For instance, unreasonable individuals would be excluded 
from the legitimation pool (borrowing a term used by Friedman 2004) 
because they do not show the epistemic modesty characteristic to con-
structivist models. By refusing to accept the burdens of judgment, i.e. “the 
many hazards involved in the correct and conscientious exercise of our 
powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life” 
(Rawls 1993: 56), they also refute the very possibility of intersubjective 
justification. This interpretation is in line with Ronzoni and Valentini’s 
argument that
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rather than indicating exactly what justice positively requires, constructivism 
helps us identify what justice must exclude. There are rules of interaction which 
agents who are vulnerable, interconnected, and concerned with leading their 
lives in accordance with their conception of the good could never unanimously 
consent to. (Ronzoni and Valentini 2008: 413)
This ties back neatly with the underdetermination objection mentioned 
in the previous sections. Even if no determinate result is achieved, con-
structivism may still be salvaged by excluding certain kinds of perspec-
tives from the legitimation pool. Thus, it can incorporate our intuition 
about the badness of some perspectives, such as racist or sexist ones, while 
also modeling their exclusion as a formal constraint on justice, and not 
as substantively charged. Cohen, on the other hand, fails to “properly 
engage with the ontological agnosticism which is the animating concern 
of constructivism” (2008: 419). Thus, Cohen’s charge poses no danger to 
a constructivist who is willing to accept the existence of methodological 
principles as grounding substantive principles. 
Political realist replies to Cohen (Hall 2013; Rossi 2016)
Hall (2013) and Rossi (2016) tackle the fact-insensitivity challenge 
from another angle. While Ronzoni and Valentini choose to assume 
that Cohen is right in saying that fundamental/ultimate principles 
of justice cannot be grounded in facts, political realists argue for the 
relevance of facts in political and moral theorizing. Hall indicates that 
the fact that an important part of political philosophy focuses on how 
to get from ideal theory to non-ideal theory “undermines the sharp 
distinction Cohen draws between principles and rules of regulation, as 
it shows that the justification of political principles is sensitive to how 
to regulate politics” (2013: 177). Furthermore, Cohen simply misplaces 
the motivation that drives agents in politics. Whereas in highly ideal-
ized, fact-insensitive situations, such as on a camping trip, agents may 
be motivated by an egalitarian ethos, the same would not be true in a 
real society. We cannot separate the realm of politics from “large-scale 
collective action problems” or from the lack of “unity of purpose”. These 
do not represent feasibility concerns, “but rather the more fundamental 
requirement that we actually address the practice with which we claim 
to be concerned” (Hall 3013: 180).
Rossi says that although there could very well exist “non-trivial 
fact-insensitive normative principles”, these lack normative power in 
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the realm of politics, i.e. “they are unable to adequately determine how 
we should judge particular political states of affairs” (Rossi 2016: 506). 
Furthermore, Cohen’s concern that relying on facts will lead to status quo 
bias is not vindicated by his reliance on moral intuitions only, which may 
engender an even more damaging status quo bias (Rossi 2016: 518). In 
order to account for the transition from “general principles to particular 
political judgment” while eschewing this potential risk, Rossi mentions 
that we should resort to an approach like Rawlsian constructivism, 
practice-dependence or political realism (2016: 516). While I agree with 
his assessment of constructivism as capable of avoiding this problem, 
I do not believe that practice-dependent accounts are able to eschew 
status quo bias. To make matters worse, Cohen’s objections gain traction 
especially when directed against practice-dependent accounts. In order 
to see why this is the case, we need to distinguish between fact-sensitive 
and fact-dependent theories and principles, a task that I will postpone 
until the end of this section. 
Constructivism is grounded on a supreme  
principle of morality (De Maagt 2016)
De Maagt (2016) argues that Cohen does not represent correctly the 
constructivist structure of justification. De Maagt accepts Cohen’s thesis 
that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical, but believes 
that constructivism can account for such a foundation (2016: 449). What 
constructivists can do is resort to “the moral conception of the person 
which functions as the basic material of construction” (2016: 450). This 
entails introducing a new distinction, between what can be called funda-
mental principles of justice and the supreme principle of morality. Unlike 
Cohen, De Maagt (following Rawls) believes that fundamental principles 
of justice can be fact-sensitive. Nonetheless, they do not represent the 
ultimate foundation of morality. What grounds these fundamental prin-
ciples, be they fact-sensitive or fact-insensitive, is the “supreme principle 
of morality”, i.e. the respect for persons as free and equals, which is not 
grounded in facts (2016: 450). De Maagt is inspired here by Kant, in 
whose theory the foundation of morality – the categorical imperative – is 
grounded just in reason. On the other hand, “what Cohen overlooks is 
that Kant’s arguments for the content of morality do include references 
to facts about human interdependence and vulnerabilities” (2016: 451).
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Conflation of fact-sensitivity and fact-dependency
How much should we rely on facts in our moral theorizing? What weight 
should facts have? At one point in his case against constructivism, Co-
hen makes an analogy between reasoning from fact-sensitive premises 
and “the lovers of sights and sounds in Book V of Plato’s Republic, who 
think it suffices for saying what justice is to say what counts as just within 
the world of sights and sounds” (Cohen 2008: 291). Cohen then argues 
that justice should transcend the facts of the world, and not commit 
the mistake of the prisoners of the cave. Is this the same way the main 
constructivist projects, such as O’Neill’s, Scanlon’s, Korsgaard’s or Rawls’, 
proceed? It is my contention that Cohen conflates here fact-sensitivity 
with fact-dependency. 
In order to understand this distinction, we must turn to Dworkin’s 
discussion on parameters and limits. Although some circumstances that 
individuals encounter are limitations on what they are able to do, others 
are parameters. Parameters “state essential conditions of a specified per-
formance” (Dworkin 2002: 261). Many ethical parameters, for Dworkin, 
are normative, by “helping define the challenge that people should face” 
(2002: 262). Dworkin introduces the discussion on parameters and limits 
in the context of how we should define a good life. Nonetheless, I believe 
that we can apply the concepts in metaethical debates as well. In Rawls’ 
works focusing on societal justice (1971, 2001), stability, publicity, or 
the necessity to incentivize individuals represent parameters. Falling 
short of them would hurt the normative enterprise. Consequently, these 
considerations ought to be included when evaluating the desirability 
of a normative project. In Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (1999), however, 
stability is seen as a limitation on what principles we can generate. The 
necessity to accommodate what Rawls calls decent hierarchical societies, 
which are merely “decent” and not “reasonable”, leads Rawls to a weaker 
conception of global justice than many of his proponents would have 
expected (Beitz 1979; Pogge 1994).
Relying so much on facts that you make concessions to unjust 
practices is closer to what Estlund (2014) calls “utopophobia” than 
merely taking facts into consideration so that the output of your theory 
is simultaneously desirable and feasible. Practice-dependent accounts 
( James 2005) make this mistake, and lean dangerously close to ethical 
positivism, “the belief that we must try to reduce norms to facts […] 
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that the existing laws are the only possible standards of goodness” (Pop-
per 1947: 59–60). On the other hand, constructivism’s incorporation 
of factual claims into its procedure is not a subjugation of norms to 
facts, but simply a way to ensure that the principles that emerge from 
the constructivist procedure will be feasible. While feasibility does not 
constitute the topic of this article, it is an important constraint on what 
justice should look like. We do not have access to a Platonic Form of 
justice that is immutable and unchanging. In our real world, we have 
to face the prospect that principles made for a far too perfect world are 
going to amount to nothing. Furthermore, the public justifiability of 
principles will be hindered if we do not resort to a certain fact-sensitivity. 
What must be avoided at all costs is fact-dependency. Cohen’s mistake 
is that he fails to separate the two concepts. 
Conclusions
In this article I have reviewed some defenses of constructivism, the 
view according to which moral principles “are not merely given to 
us, but rather the products of thought […] not created from nothing, 
but rather constructed from various resources appropriate to political 
judgment” (Buckley, n.d.). I have compared the metaethical claims of 
constructivism with its main rival, intuitionism, placing constructivism 
toward antirealism in the realist–antirealist positioning debate. As a co-
herentist theory of justification, constructivism’s claims can be defended 
by resorting to a method such as reflective equilibrium, which I have 
argued best captures the appeal of intuition in moral thinking without 
assuming too much from an ontological standpoint, as intuitionism does 
owing to its foundationalist roots. Toward the end of the paper I have 
presented several arguments extant in the literature against Cohen’s 
criticism of constructivism, ending with a novel objection, that Cohen 
conflates fact-sensitivity (which is not problematic for constructivism) 
with fact-dependency (which constructivism does not entail and which 
should indeed be rejected). As the paper has been intended as a review 
article, I have not discussed the latter objection at length. However, it can 
represent a new avenue for research, further contributing to the reasons 
why constructivism is uniquely situated among the metaethical views 
investigated here in generating principles that can be widely accepted. 
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